Dr. Andrew Novo | More than a narrative history of the period, an analysis of British policy, or a description of counter-insurgency operations, this book lays out an examination of the underpinnings of the enosis cause and its manifestation in action. It argues that the strategic myopia of the enosis movement shackled the cause, defined its conduct, and was the primary reason for its failure.

Dr. David Ucko | The New Counterinsurgency Era examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations.

Dr. Thomas Marks | This study builds upon the earlier work of the author to provide a definitive exploration of the most effective means of irregular warfare yet devised. Comparing the Asian cases of Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—with Peru used as as a prominent out-of-area Maoist standbearer—Dr Thomas A. Marks examines the strategy and operational art that make people’s war such a devastating technique of armed politics.